Fields of Potentiality: Part 2 – Posthuman Developments and Flows

The evolutions of capitalist organisation have been along dividual lines, as both market developments and corporate forms become singular and combinatory in their nature and relations. New addresses have formed that constitute different methods of organisation beyond current institutional methods of measurement. The initial organisation of capitalism and markets was premised initially upon the centrality of private property and individual ownership. Individuals traded wares in markets and exchanged ownership of goods for money or some other equivalent. They would occasionally form firms so as to better organise their resources and increase their efficiency and productivity by limiting the market’s effects through internal transfers and contracts that organised production with the aim of producing whole products from initially fragmented parts.

“In a world that was extremely inefficient, it would be hard to find and measure things (high triangulation costs), it would be difficult to bargain and pay (high transfer costs) and it would be difficult to trust the counterparty to fulfil the contract (high trust costs). In that world, firms would tend to be large. It would be inefficient to buy things from the market and so entrepreneurs would tend to accumulate large payrolls. Most people would work full-time jobs for large firms. If you wanted to take your family to the beach twice a year, you would need to own the beach house because it would be too inefficient to rent, the reality before online marketplaces like AirBnB showed up. Consumers would need to own nearly everything they might conceivably need. Even if they only used their fruit dehydrator twice a year, they’d need to own it because the transaction costs involved in renting it would be too high”[1].

In situations where markets aren’t fully efficient or competitive, ownership is an extremely important concept as it delineates where things lie, and thus allows for individual control and allocation over one’s resources and contractual relations. Firms are owned by individual shareholders and managed by individual managers, and they own various resources and organise their logistical organisation around these resources and the resources of the entities that contract with them (labourers, other firms, suppliers) thus expanding out into webs of interconnection where ownership(s) is complex but still clear. Government as well formed a part of these of interconnections as they provided regulatory stability and infrastructural provision that creates economies of scale (and by extension subsidises diseconomies). This could be adequately summed up by the great compromise of Keynesian fiscal management and post-war capitalism, where labour, firms and government formed a tripartite system of interrelated services and obligations. The first limited strikes and guaranteed labour market stability. The second provided long-term hierarchical job structures and linked pay with productivity. The third provided a regulatory environment that limited both the previous actors’ excesses and a series of services (welfare, monetary and fiscal policies) that maintained national stability.

However, when markets and software begin to eat the world, these relations suddenly become redundant. A system of clearly-defined ownership and individual obligations organised through rigid institutions could not cope with the increasing globalisation of economies of scale and the fluidity of fiscal and monetary policies created by tax competition, floating exchange rates and international money and capital flows. New logistical possibilities grew from the internet and the technics of platform companies (Amazon, Facebook, Apple, etc.) that reduced triangulation costs (by making it easier to source, produce and find products through international trade flows) and transfer costs (by “bringing together and facilitating the negotiation of mutually beneficial commercial or retail deals”)[2]. We can see this in the development of the sharing economy, where the concept of ownership gives way to an interconnected series of mutual relations, where resources and capital are used across multiple business lines and the relationship of product-to-consumer becomes more important than the individual customer/user. We see a number of large platforms with a long tail of smaller businesses that provide logistical support, infrastructural capacity and niche products/resources. The ubiquity of the Toyota model of production so to speak. And this goes further as the concept of individual ownership is superseded by the idea of sharing in networks of mutually beneficial relations.

“Yet, we can already start to imagine a world which Munger calls ‘Tomorrow 3.0.’ You need a drill to hang some shelves in your new apartment. You open an app on your smartphone and tap ‘rent drill.’ An autonomous car picks up a drill and delivers it outside your apartment in a keypad-protected pod and your phone vibrates ‘drill delivered.’ Once you’re done, you put it back in the pod, which sends a message to another autonomous car nearby to come pick it up. The rental costs $5, much less than buying a commercial quality power drill. This is, of course, not limited to drills—it could have been a saw, fruit dehydrator, bread machine or deep fryer. You own almost nothing, but have access to almost everything. You, nor your neighbors, have a job, at least in the traditional sense. You pick up shifts or client work as needed and maybe manage a few small side businesses. After you finish drilling the shelves in, you might sit down at your computer and see what work requests are open and work for a few hours on designing a new graphic or finishing up the monthly financial statements for a client”[3].

These are dividual lines of relationality where emotional connectivity and spare product capacity are indexed and used as markers for their pricing and further measurement of use. There isn’t a production line of divided labourers with specific mechanical tasks, but instead a series of open-ended tasks and processes. Organisations become singular subsistences with management ethoses and mission statements. They are endowed with individual rights and given levels of social responsibility, where they act as much as governing operators as companies aiming for profit. Companies and organisations are aggregators of social relations related to branding, stakeholders and ethical reasoning. They are not simply collections of individuals organised into groups with set tasks, but a series of learning organisations that are meant to grow and adapt as complexity multiplies levels of knowledge and information and divides these mechanical task-based groupings into constituent parts. The sharing economy, the adaptive corporation and the developments in automation are the production of social relations, where capitalist profit transforms and combines with forms of direct mutuality in how we trade and value each other’s labour, production and consumption. In other words, capitalism metastasises immeasurable levels of social relations (thus producing dividual lines) but in that spreading out also redefines itself as capitalism becomes further overdetermined by these relations, which directly question profit and production-for-use. What are stakeholders if not new dividual elements in corporate organisation, beyond the individuated picture of a consumer/customer. What is governance if not the increasing complexity of organising resources and labour within markets and plans, where government(s) is subsumed in this wider governance.

“Who or what could organize universal addressing platforms and distribute their rights and regulations, especially now? Anthropocenic economic axioms lean everything toward an imperative of connection, to link one market with another, one location with another, one gesture with another, and to capture all things under the rubric of universal exchange where they might communicate without interference, friction, noise, distance, or delay”[4]. Yet as these relations are put under the rubric of universal exchange, exchange itself is morphed into different systems of relations, different linguistic and definitional variations that posit not systems of profit but modes of potentiality beyond capitalist ontology. When markets eat everything the catallaxic complexity this breeds creates information-distribution problems that create constant subversion and with it significant externalities (environmental, social and infrastructural). However, reality shows that these externalities come attached with real actors who suffer the consequences of market ignorance due to pricing failures, and that in dealing with this governance there cannot simply be a market ontology of constant changes in decision-making due to financial and/or logistical flux. It will come up against alternate ontologies in battlespaces and intercursive frameworks, whether these be ecological, platform-based, state-based or posthuman. These interactions define our fields of potentiality as old problems contract and new problems expand, increasing the potential for experimentalism and exit, as well as new forms of design and voice. However, in this expansive field the potential for white noise and sublimation are also increased.

One beginning method of organisation that can be seen in these dividual lines is the development of corporate organisation into modes of governance related to social responsibility, welfare and the positioning of stakeholders. “‘Corporate citizenship’ also suggests firms having both the rights and the powers of citizens, and sees them as definitely part of the polity and not confined to the market. This is useful for a realistic approach to contemporary corporate behaviour. When they are making their own regulation through standards, or acting not just as lobbies but as insiders to the public decision-making process, firms can be seen as exercising a kind of citizenship right. When their critics argue that, if these are the rights they are claiming, then they must expect to be subjected to demands of good behaviour going beyond their need to maximize profits within the market, they are making the reasonable point that citizenship rights need to be accompanied by responsibilities”[5]. Corporations are thus treated as being endowed with individual rights, which then defines individual rights as dividual responsibilities to various systems that make up corporations.

“Nevertheless, this argument still places the initiative with the firms: it is their market strategy that determines (or at least strongly affects) whether particular government policies will be ‘rewarded’ with investment or not, whether these are policies for making available a population to work at low wages or one with high skills and secure lives. Globalization does not mean a race to the bottom, but it does increase the power of global firms in setting the rules of the race”[6]. Crouch notes how firms have become dominant actors in pluralist societies, encompassing elements of market and governing ontologies that allow them significant control in the way they plan their industrial affairs, as well as significant access to cross-border trade flows and international markets. The issue at hand then isn’t too much profit and inequality versus too little collective redistribution, but rather a matter of what will govern redistribution and inequality and can it control the informational and intercursive flows that will swell and coalesce beneath, above and around it.

Part of the reason transnational corporations, and in particular platforms, have grown in governing success is due to their current ability to integrate these increasing complexities and produce population-wide benefits. Regarding the problems of associative governance in trade and industry compared to TNCs, “it remains the case that, at any moment during a period of high change and innovation, old, declining sectors will be better represented by sector-level organizations than new, dynamic ones”[7]. In other words, dynamic sectors are better represented as dividual sets of stakeholders and socio-economic relations in contrast to monolithic sectors that are represented by individual organisations acting in a set, collective manner.

Platforms and international companies are able to incorporate multiple stakeholders through their governance mechanisms by controlling the flow of information and goods. This is the case with Walmart, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Twitter and many other companies of this kind that are both market actors in the sense they produce goods for profitable reasons, as well as governance structures that are ordered by wider responsibilities involving fiduciary responsibilities, information gatekeeping, market structuring and other governing pathologies. This follows a further transformation in the state as sovereignty segues outwards, toward trade bodies, international regulatory agencies and TNCs who lobby and help codify standards. Here we then see a potential intersection in the posthuman subject-user field, as these platforms allow for both a clannish insularity that protects people from technological acceleration through the mechanisms of corporate social responsibility and corporate charters, and potentially allows for their own supersession through internal dynamics that they can’t control, such as fake news, botnets, populist subversion, ontological clashes between human and machinic users (such as over how algorithms govern what we see and hear) as well as other informational complexities[8].

How user subjectivities are formed is composite in relation to these machinations, as platform companies both structure how we interact and see ourselves (through branding, advertising, networking and profile building), and through our profiles we structure these companies by forcing them to create choice architectures that attempt to cohere into a cooperative social entity (with the possibility that this is not possible). This is further complicated by the provision of individual rights to corporate forms, whereby they are endowed with free speech and other constitutional guarantees and human rights. Corporate actors become individuated members of a pluralist society, creating further layers of abstraction and alternative organisational ecologies against and alongside existing nation-states and international organisations.

Further complications further arise from the subversive elements beneath and between platform companies, particularly the development of blockchain technology and trustless systems of exchange and communication. Blockchains in particular present the potential for whole systems of posthuman users through decentralised autonomous organisations that are given a series of codes that then set how they produce things and interact with others. This is both autopoietic, as the system reproduces itself through its laws and codes, and allopoietic, as it integrates user information and produces new contracts, methods of data gathering, and markets for the use and exchange of data, thereby expanding the system and ingraining the potential for new accidents to change its governing mechanisms. “Public blockchains may allow aggregation without the aggregators. For certain use cases, perhaps few, perhaps many, public blockchains like bitcoin will allow the organization and coordination benefits of firms and the motivation of markets while maintaining a large selectorate”[9]. The nexus of contracts that make up firms and create their dividual lines produces further forms of dividuation as these contracts spread out beyond firms, organising users in systems like blockchains that don’t require the intermediation of a trusted third party (whether that be a platform or a government).

Here we see the production of new relations between humans and between humans and other abstractions such as logistical networks and autonomous blockchain entities. Markets in everything then expands the addressability of lives and relations between things, further adding informational complexity as well as producing sub-routing potentials that both decentralise knowledge, information and capital, as well as allowing actors to wall off and border blockchain topologies, developing specific blockchain sovereignties and differing levels of techonomic autonomy. This creates varieties of market beyond current institutional controls, thus moving us beyond institutional “modernities” toward “multiple modernities” and “modes of regulation”[10] as a meta-anarchy of sovereign and sub-sovereign relations collide. Market ontologies of various kinds combine and contrast with posthuman user-subjects, creating new areas of private totalitarian control as well as new methods of independence and autonomy away from our current institutional modernities.

How then governance structures interact with these autopoietic systems produces those fields of potentiality and battlespaces that define the ways users are defined and governed. The individual is no longer the centre, as instead corporate rights interact with contracts of relations that structure exchange and markets, as well as systems of definitions  and profiles that become our public-facing identities. New forms of citizenship and integration are borne as we define ourselves by either our anonymity/pseudonymity on blockchains, or through our corporate nexus within platforms and social media. These systems (corporate, blockchain, platform, citizenship) are developing their own methods of cognition from their constituent parts, combining and contrasting their subsystems to continually adapt and survive, as well as thrive. Methods of autopoiesis and allopoiesis are developing from these systemic concatenations.

On a different tack, dividual lines that produce new forms of subjectivity can be seen in the dispersion and conflicts surrounding citizenship, national identity and sovereignty in liberal nation-states today, particularly the US and UK. The development of networked tribes and populist subversion have produced ontological clashes between two different forms of  sovereign understanding that intersect these nation-states both geographically and temporally. Modes of conflictual sovereignties have developed within these nations that develop radically different understandings of what a nation-state is and should be in the international system. These can be defined as logistical sovereignty and cultural sovereignty.

Logistical sovereignty denotes an understanding that prises cosmopolitanism, international flows of trade and knowledge, shared and scaled international cooperation, and a perspective that generally sees sovereignty as something tradable and negotiatory. Those who voted remain in the European referendum or oppose Trump tend to fall within this ideological purview. They are metropolitan, university educated and fit well within the knowledge economy. “Research conducted by the Centre For Towns think-tank (based in Bolton, in the United Kingdom,) has highlighted the ways in which the transition from an industrialised economy to a post-industrial knowledge economy, since the 1980s, has seen the big cities and university towns become younger, in terms of their demographic profile, as the smaller non-uni towns have become older”[11]. They tend to hold liberal views surrounding culture due to their location (generally multicultural cities), education and age. “This transition from an industrialised economy to a knowledge economy and the corollary rapid and large expansion in higher education participation has fundamentally altered our political geography”[12]. This profound change led to a geographic concentration of liberal ideology within metropolitan areas, where the large majority of both votes against Trump and votes for remain came from.

Cultural sovereignty is the opposite of this logistical perspective, instead viewing sovereignty as an all-or-nothing entity that when traded away or shared is diminished. This cultural perspective largely ignores trade as a major factor in the way sovereignty is delineated, except in instances where it is seen as an expression or expansion of sovereign power (as through tariff wars or the image of an independent, free-trading Britain). Through the research I’ve collated, things like voting for Trump or supporting Brexit come primarily from a cultural base. With Brexit, the things that correlated most with voting to leave were one’s social attitudes[13] related to views on the death penalty, one’s perception of Britain’s social landscape, views on multiculturalism and views on immigration. For the latter three it was a negative appraisal of these things that tended to show a link to voting to leave. For this sovereign perspective, the increase in cultural complexity brought about by immigration and globalisation (particularly the globalisation of values and their relativisation in educational and political narratives) is viewed primarily negatively as producing worse social outcomes compared to the period before levels of immigration were as high and the socio-economic forms of identity in Britain were more simplified. Similar patterns are seen in the election of Trump, where increasing levels of complexity related to immigration, import substitution and the loss of major industries painted a bleak socio-cultural picture.

In effect these political events were not fought on policy, but rather on imagery and perspectival lenses that are incommensurable. As these events have metastasised, the original ideologies that inculcated these groups have hardened, producing new political maps that intersect politics along lines of remain/leave or nationalism/cosmopolitanism. Networked tribes are formed out of this conflictual sovereignty as dividual lines have been drawn that treat ideological markers as methods of group identification, subsuming the individual to the group and focusing on alternate methods of organisation, rhetoric and propaganda. Things like leave means leave, MAGA, people’s vote and other campaigns and slogans that serve as markers for ideological backgrounds. When these networked tribes do use electoral politics, its primarily to further an agenda or develop a platform for legitimation rather than use these avenues as means for debate and policy-making. There is no real policy from things like a second referendum or WTO Brexit except as simplistic solutions that further the conflict already present. Instead policy-making as the act of improving individual’s lot in national and/or international spaces is subsumed or ignored as ideological markers and tribal identities  are formed from geographic concentrations and social media activity that intersect individual concerns and prise group identity as the primary mechanism for political ideology. Formed through campaign groups, marketing tools and the echo chambers of social media, the individual is a-centred as a political subject.

Going further from these economic and political machinations, there also exist whole new fields of subject-users that represent a gamut of posthuman possibilities. “In the disappearance, or at least displacement, of the essential human User, a multitude crowds into and overflows the evacuated position. As the existential incorporation of information into the User-subject works to consolidate and then explode its humanist register, it does so by placing the biological materiality of the human subject onto a common plane with other actors and events. It doesn’t unwind human privilege into formlessness; it leverages and augments its form with other, perhaps livelier post-human (nonhuman, inhuman, ahuman) agents and subjects. Along a legal axis, this spans from the recognition of the prospective ‘personhood’ of other species (dolphins, apes, rainforests, artificial intelligence, robots) to the formalization of the personhood of corporations, complete with constitutional rights to free speech and to bear arms beyond those of the individual people who may comprise them”[14]. A whole range of citizenship claims and sovereign possibilities erupt from this scenario, as does the complexity of governing their various rights claims and linguistic outputs.

What rights does a digital user have? Do profiles constitute adequate informational matrices for determining one’s identity and one’s access to a series of platforms and apparatuses. The basis of Deleuze’s society of control is the extent of sensors and technological organisms not just monitoring you and your data, but also interpreting it and using this to manipulate your behaviours by limiting access to certain things and allowing access to others. The move from autopoiesis to allopoiesis means the production of subjectivities that limit and open in different measures. An automatic system that limits an addicts access to drugs/alcohol or a subversive political agent’s access to housing, food or other essentials. Eventually subjectivity is bent slowly toward accepting these limitations by either leaving these systems or modifying their behaviour to allow for access. A marketing bot develops consumer habits by convincing its consumer base of the benevolence, ethics or usefulness of its products. “Inauthenticity is becoming the hallmark of our era: faked Facebook data, faked college admissions applications, faked resumes and ‘bullshit jobs’, faked news, faked mortgage-back security ratings, AI pretending to be humans, humans pretending to be AI”[15]. The human subject-user in these situations fragments into its dividual parts, “a thick cloud of shadows”[16] of profilic data that defines human users by what data they present publicly, and also what information they don’t present. User maps can be developed that begin to understand both what these users want, and thus can have access to, and what they don’t want and either need to have their personality bent towards this unwanted perspective, or have limited or no access to it.

But this goes beyond the influence upon individual human subjects and creating dividual lines out of them. This is also about relations between autonomous systems, creating ecologies of virtual exchange that aren’t reliant upon human interfacing. The spam and information output of spider searches, spambots, botnets and emails suggest a whole ecology of user-to-user communication which is non-human. “But perhaps it is not spam, and the presentation and exchange of alluring information is exactly what happens already in the coordination of sympathetic and symbiotic relationships in nature, say, between a bee and a bright flower or a peacock displaying for a peahen”[17]. Whole structures of deep address are arranged that map the relations between these non-human users, where they exchange and influence each other. This is beyond the current marketing tools and big data analytics that are intrinsically related to human subjectivities. Its entirely possible to see the construction of new realities and lifeworlds where DAOs attempt to finance themselves by accessing capital through algo-traders. Bots attempt to corrupt law codes through malware or spamming due to their evolved preferences. Autonomous vehicles create their own networks of data-driven traffic management, navigating roads through the fares that are decided through swarm intelligence based on the proximity of potential fares, and the money they could potentially earn. And further through their self-organisation they could form collective means of representation that posit new forms of code governing who can pick up which fare, how profits are distributed and how and where taxi licences are given out.

New battlespaces can be created both for the purposes of logistical competition between autonomous organisations attempting to influence consumers, earn profit for reinvestment and maintain stakeholders, and for the development of new methods of warfare. Warfare transforms from battlespaces defined by fluid infantries attempting to capture targets/territory through combinations of ground-based and air-based battle-planning to autonomous systems organising the battlespace for the purpose of controlling the demographics of an enemy territory’s population, and controlling the informational infrastructure of an enemies’ communication networks and propaganda tools. Previous generations of warfare, particularly 3GW and 4GW, require significant ideological coherency amongst combatants. In 3GW, infantrymen go to war either through patriotic fervour or the force of the state drafting them. In 4GW, insurgents become part of insurgencies due to deeply held feelings regarding their enemy. Look at al-Qaeda, the IRA or Mao’s cultural revolutionaries. In 5GW, there would be focus upon the enemies’ intellectual/informational strength rather than its ideological commitment. “A 5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever was a war”[18]. Instead of affecting morale or ideology, “5GW focuses on the enemy’s ‘fingertips and gut'”[19].

5th generation warfare is a method geared toward obfuscation and ideological arbitrage, as combatants attempt to enter enemies OODA loop’s at the observation stage, affecting the way they see the battlefield and thereby changing their orientation and thus the rest of the OODA loop (decision, action). In battlespaces of this kind, experimentation and openness may well be lethal, as being open in your idea formation allows for the infiltration and subsumption to your enemies’ OODA loop. As Lewis noted with CGI influencers, as well as other posthuman actors, infiltration and obfuscation are fragmented toward non-state actors who can influence people’s consumption decisions and political actions through branding, social media and affecting the line of sight through targeted advertising and algorithmic individuation.

Cryptographic and techonomic means are best at developing and actioning these kinds of ideological arbitrage, entering an enemies’ networks through obfuscating and generating false information and nonsense to create confusion and dispersed fear. “Artificial Intelligence, deep learning, machine learning, computer vision, neuro-linguistic programming, virtual reality and augmented reality are all part of the future battlespace. They are all underpinned by potential advances in quantum computing that will create a conflict environment in which the decision-action loop will compress dramatically from days and hours to minutes and seconds…or even less”[20]. These technologies shorten OODA loops as combatants have less time to observe and orient as their enemies are second-guessing them and creating informational nexuses that posit false information. Organisations (autonomous and human) cannot develop concepts to orient their decisions as these can be based on informatic junk, thus requiring increasing levels of informational complexity to combat this junk and produce their own methods of undermining other’s OODA loops. One can begin to see this with Russian interference in democratic procedures, where the “IRA (Internet Research Agency) has employed thousands of white collar workers who study online communities in order to imitate them, form personal relationships with internet activists, and organize IRL protests. What they’re doing amounts to a sort of digital appropriation or group identity theft. They stoke people’s ingroup identities with propaganda and impressively nuanced memes”[21]. Political intelligence and social information cannot be trusted in such environments as everything is potentially tainted.

Thus new methods for information development and organisational/logistical anti-fragility are needed to combat this, and produce coherent strategies for the gatekeeping of information. “We imply that the process of Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Restructure is repeated endlessly in moving to higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this unfolding drama, the alternating cycle of entropy increase toward more and more dis-order and the entropy decrease toward more and more order appears to be one part of a control mechanism that literally seems to drive and regulate this alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration”[22]. Elaboration, as in the development of anti-fragile systems to combat enemy movements within one’s OODA loops, in this case outpaces human modes of temporal understanding as time loops close from minutes to seconds. Levels of abstraction develop which emplace humans as a-centred subjects on the battlespace, competing alongside autonomous informational and conflictual systems that shape the direction of battle and the methods for developing OODA loops in dividual circumstances of meta-systemic organisational complexity where ideological warfare competes against hyper-computised action plans and adaptations.

War machines spill over as new generations of warfare coalesce. The question of where humans fit in these new weird configurations leads to conflictual patterns emerging. Levels of addressability go down to depths that split individual subjectivities into their core components, their profilic data and logistical capacity as producers and consumers, as emotional facilitators and agents of war. “Divergent, deterritorialized and decoded flows and forces are treated as having ‘nomadic’ qualities; the ‘war machine’ is the next stage of this analysis, focusing on the more intransigent and conflict-driven aspects of their functions”[23]. In patterns of 5GW and hyperwar, these war machines move far beyond the human subject as autonomous organisations and systems produce relations between themselves of alternative methods of intercursive flow. Of warfare, exchange, production and information. Increasing levels of complexity and speed beyond human comprehension lead to new institutional/infrastructural configurations produced by these posthuman subjects that can interpret these intercursive flows. New methods of subjectivity, citizenship and organisational ecology are created that posit a new human relation to them.

Thus the autonomous posthuman user is a disturbing potential, being framed as swarming and insectoid. The concept of self-driving autonomous vehicles becoming sentient users able to make profit and garner profile data is framed in this entomological language, as their collective intelligence through GPS tracking and data self-management is painted in the terms of swarms of driverless cars contained within collective hive minds. These new logistical and organisational possibilities produce new ontologies for conceptualising and abstracting information and using it to delineate spaces of action. “For the individual agent and complex system alike, this is the continual re-assessment of reality following the (vital) trauma of ontological crisis”[24]. These new ontologies further dividuate the circumstances of being and identity, and produce posthuman forms that compete in increasingly level playing fields for political viability and social recognition. The need develops then to posit new forms of human subjectivity that can coexist in these complexified fields, where governance is an increasingly fraught multiplicity that must deal with multiple subject-users, mapping and understanding their linguistic, relational patterns.




[4] Benjamin Bratton, The Stack

[5] Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism

[6] Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism

[7] Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism



[10] Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization North and South




[14] Benjamin Bratton, The Stack


[16] Benjamin Bratton, The Stack

[17] Benjamin Bratton, The Stack








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