I’ve written many times on the ineffectiveness of national populism as a movement to drive forward new forms of meaning-making that combat the Cathedral. The idea that new ethno-cultural identities will seriously emerge from movements and situations which are struggling to deal with demo-bureaucratic structures and have found themselves caught up in the same institutional deadlocks they claimed to be moving beyond is frankly contemptible. While it may be said that one must start somewhere, the starting point should at least be realistic. The modern American state, and its equivalents in much of Western Europe, is no starting point for the production and preservation of ethnic enclaves or for the redevelopment of metaphysical identities. These states, which were foundational in allowing for the development of the rot in the first place, are now fundamental parts of the institutional matrices of the elite. If Trump and Brexit were meant to be markers of success, then its failed.
However this is relatively obvious to any observer not caught in the tribalistic mess of these events. They are cheap shots which certainly fill column inches and blogposts, but they lack any substance as to either a direction out of this quagmire or a more foundational reasoning for what kind of ethno-cultural identities should be produced or preserved, and how this should be done. Away from the blatant misadventures of national populism, its basic reasoning is itself extremely flawed. National populism is the mirror image of modern liberalism, a position of decay that posits the opposite foundation. If the liberal is pro-immigrant, the populist is anti-immigrant. If the liberal is pro-abortion, the populist is anti-abortion. So on and so forth. But all this occurs on the same surface, within the same system. The structures of new orders are never constructed, only the production of increasing volatility with the structural limits of spillover still in place. Populism thus becomes a seething hotbed of nothingness. It contains only what it takes as against its opponents, looking for new entrances into the system despite the walls collapsing around it. Alain de Benoist notes this in his criticism of modern day Islamophobes, those mostly within Western Europe and America who define the majority of their mission around opposing Islam and preserving the liberal democratic character of the West. Mobs of people, members of the English Defence League or the BNP, irregularly come together to shout slogans and make themselves look stupid. At no point in this mass of moronic fervour are there any indications of new socio-political organisation that can lead to the preservation of ethno-cultural identity and shared knowledge.
What can be seen is a development of the attitudes of the last man in a slightly revised form. The last man is a “typical citizen of a liberal democracy… who, schooled by the founders of modern liberalism, gave up prideful belief in his or her own superior worth in favor of comfortable self-preservation. Liberal democracy produced “men without chests,” composed of desire and reason but lacking thymos, clever at finding new ways to satisfy a host of petty wants through the calculation of long-term self-interest. The last man had no desire to be recognized as greater than others, and without such desire no excellence or achievement was possible. Content with his happiness and unable to feel any sense of shame for being unable to rise above those wants, the last man ceased to be human”. Emplaced within their social position, the last man has come to accept their place. Their own sense of ego is sublimated to banal concerns that suit the wider ideological stratum. The national populist sentiment, that of making America great again that Barghest identities with the seed of a wider thymos, is really a further expression of this lack of desire, this belief in one’s own eternality in their simplicity. Its also imbued with a deep irony in the case of Trump’s America, as making America great seems to be simply turning back 60 years to the mythical 1950s, when the aims of building great buildings, reviving industries or looking at space as a frontier for some form of settler expansion were locked in the very monopolies and corporations which became part and parcel of the consumerist lifestyle seemingly so abhorred by those in the Alt-Right. It also seems, in its zeal, to identify America’s military strength as one of the great things that America produces. This is despite this military strength really being an extension of the non-empathic altruism that is right within the American ideological spectrum. Simply look at the Arab Spring, or the assassination of bin Laden, to see this petty but significant undercurrent of American military strength fully backed by the public with zealotry and steadfast belief. Or the current nonsense surrounding Russian interference if we look to the flipside of Trumpian America, that of modern American liberalism. Really, America has never been great, rather a nation where ideology and reality have never met.
These examples demonstrate a current of belief that suggests we are all equals together in the movement of our wider national society. Politics as the production of goals set amongst various sets of men of the public who stand above others is replaced by mobs of people screaming angrily about not much at all. It is the movement from order to democracy to tyranny as Plato describes, as the order of things is inverted by those who crave freedom against those who have begun to grant it. “When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cupbearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs”. National populism in this analogy is simply a cupbearer with a slightly different personality.
At the most basic level, national populism is the attempt to re-forge the American identity (however so defined) through the institutions of the American state. An impossible dream devoid of any contextual support outside of vain hopes for Trump to become a strongman leader. All that will happen is their demands may well be sublimated and supplanted by the wider structures of the bureaucratic American state, in much the same way Brexit was quite easily sublimated by changes in the political language that emphasised a pastiche form of British identity and some renewed sense of national strength and vigour. This will lead to an expansion of the military-industrial complex as American international power is cheered on in all its mishaps and bloodthirst, while domestic conditions will stay much the same. Some steel subsidies and tariffs there, some crackdowns on immigrants in sanctuary cities elsewhere, but all in all a continuation of the status quo by slightly different means. The mass character of American governance and society will continue onwards as is now evident under the Trump presidency.
Thus the question of ethno-cultural identity, of its delineations and borders, is still left open as the increasingly tribal populations of the West look for socio-political systems that actually exercise power and allows for something like representation and the preservation of their (fragmented) cultural identities. There is the constant search for a unifying Dasein, a principle bringing together the shared sets of nature, state and history. As evidenced by the failures of national populism, such a set of principles will not be found there. However, among the other avenues being pursued by elements of the Alt-Right, similar issues of the actualisation of structures which can preserve and encourage identity are present. Fundamental elements of Alt-Right thinking tend to toward a biological determinism that suggests our being is objectively tied to race. “European man” as a wholly determinate concept “will inevitably tower above others. As such, the cultivation of European tradition boils down simply to a eugenic question: secure a homeland for white European man and segregate him from others, and being European man, he will inevitably be in health”. This not only ignores the development of culture in the interplay of trade and the rise and fall of multicultural empires, but also the differential elements that make up a race or ethnicity. This concept of European as an entity, something wholly identifiable through particular characteristics, ignores the huge cultural, linguistic and social disparities between sub-European populations. The differences between Northern and Southern Italians, the Catalans and the Andalusians, and the North and South of the UK, as well as the differences within these groups, are tacitly ignored in favour of a White ethnicity which should be unifying. This tends to repeat the same mistakes as that of national populism in reproducing a quasi-democratic feeling of racial equality within one’s group, removing distinctions of class and franchise in favour of a politics just as reductive as those described by Plato in the destructive effects of unfettered political freedoms.
A more expansive concept of race is needed to better examine the dynamics of identity-construction and meaning-making that doesn’t simply reduce all of one’s thymos to their racial background. The undefined greatness of White European man seems to become another system of centralised mass that changes the makeup of the institutional matrices of political power. There is a great irony in the biological determinism of elements of the Alt-Right which feeds in to a kind of populism. Richard Spencer’s overt dream to develop a collective white identity is regularly scuppered by the inconvenient fact that a large majority of white people in America and Europe don’t give a shit. They are happy to live within their wider hedonism, dying metaphysically and without thought to other considerations. The aim of constructing a kind of Roman Empire as Spencer desires is nothing more than a fanciful waste of time. The Roman Empire was not a great White empire that conquered the world. It had peripheries and internal borders, as well as an extremely complex set of cultural and social differences between its constituent populations that were differentiated by degrees of enfranchisement and political authority. Despite its great mass, it was defined by a set of multi-institutional characteristics that were variable. Even if such a mythic empire of White identity and greatness did exist, there is no chance of it coming back now.
Thus the talk of red-pilling amongst the racialists of the Alt-Right is even more ironic as the great message of the Matrix was that overt human destiny was nothing more than a control mechanism in the wider conflict of human-vs-machine – an act of cyber-warfare that created specific pathways. The Faustian dream imagined by Spencer and others quickly moves away from a red pill of realisation to a black pill of conceptual nothingness. A grand dream is nothing more than a delusion found amongst the huge expanse of collective unconsciousness. “All things organic are dying in the grip of organization. An artificial world is permeating and poisoning the natural. Civilization has itself become a machine that does or tries to do, everything in mechanical fashion. We think only in horsepower now; we cannot look at a waterfall without mentally turning it into electric power; we cannot survey a countryside full of pasturing cattle without thinking of its exploitation as a source of meat supply; we cannot look at the beautiful old handwork of a lively and primitive people without wishing to replace it by a modern technical process… But all this is changing ever more noticeably in the last decades, in all the countries where large-scale industry is of old standing. The Faustian thought begins to be sick of machines. A weariness is spreading, a sort of pacifism in the battle with Nature. Men are returning to forms of life simpler and nearer to Nature…They would fain get away from the pressure of soulless facts, from enslavement to the Machine…Occultism and Spiritualism, Indian philosophies, metaphysical inquisitiveness under Christian or pagan colouring, all of which were despised in the Darwinian period, are coming up again…Out of satiety of life, men take refuge from civilization in the more primitive parts of the earth, in vagabondage, in suicide”. Instead of looking at forging greatness in this organisational expanse, creating meaning-making from the elements we have around us, they look back to mythical pasts that are neither realistic nor possible, subtly black-pilling themselves into a false destiny of the White man. No new Dasein, no new form of organisation that fits into the structures of reality, is being created by dreaming about mass organisation and the creation of a new empire.
In looking at structures and forms that are actually conducive to ethno-cultural preservation, we then need more expansive definitions that are not so deterministic in their conception and action. Spengler’s concept of race begins to move us in that direction, defining race as the “cosmic-plantlike side of life”, where one’s relations of tribe, clan or family are subsumed in their land and shared blood. While this initially sounds like the same massified idea that Spencer postulates in understanding race, Spengler actually sees it as one element in man’s inner-being and collective organisation. Alongside race exist both language and peoples. In recognising people, Spengler sees a more heterogeneous concept that states man has his own destinies that are wrapped within and throughout his properties of race and language. These are imbued as being and waking-being respectively. Race as being is thus “something cosmic and psychic, periodic in some obscure way, and in its inner nature partly conditioned by major astronomical relations”. It is effected by the great events of human history that are part of the lineage of one’s ethno-cultural makeup, and periodic in the sense that its position and situation are constantly shifting. While they make exist within particular lands and lifeworlds, they are moveable and variable depending on the surrounding institutions and structures. This inconstant nature of race comes from the other part of being, that of waking-consciousness, the effects of language. Language in Spengler’s concept is “the entire free activity of the waking microcosm in so far as it brings something to expression for others”. While race is expressed as timed and yearned for, language is expressed as space and fear. Inner-being in this sense is structured through one’s group identity and the way that identity interacts with others in and out of the group. It is not fixed immemorially and nor does it predetermine the direction of individual destiny. Race is layered in other relations of the socius, neither being dominant nor inferior.
It is obvious and easy to point out in the current modes of socio-political organisation that ethnicity and race, particularly amongst those defined as White or European, are denigrated. The reality of modern discourse on culture, immigration and “racism” is clear to see. One cannot complain of their neighbours for fear of raising the ire of a multitude of bureaucracies, councils and low-level criminals. Drugs, noise, drunkenness and other behaviours and activities are tacitly encouraged as policing is purposefully neutered, and any sense of community and neighbourliness long gone. Many feel extreme unease as their neighbours do not resemble their own characteristics, whether ethnic or cultural. But this unease remains voiceless, barely able to express itself except through the occasional vote (i.e. the BNP winning council seats or parts of Trump’s electoral vote). National populism has nothing to say to this other than picking one fault among many. It says nothing of the need for bridging and bonding capital, as Putnam identified as important toward constituting communities and polities that encourage both outward communication via language and inward cohesion via shared racial and cultural markers. Modern communities have developed institutional situations that encourage neither, allowing for ethnic divisions to fester with political authority falling through toward the mob. As West notes, in the construction of institutions we will inevitably see the constitution of in-groups and out-groups as attitudes of kin selection mix with communicable variables between and within communities. In this sense, racial homogeneity is never truly possible as groups break away and layered relations of class and hierarchy develop within in-groups. The issue of national populism, and of a biological or nationalist determinism more widely, is its attempt to subsume this institutional matrix into a simple mass that is undefined and uncomplicated.
The first thing in developing this ethno-cultural consciousness would be to recognise the surrounding institutional environment. This means not only recognising the current denigration of certain ethnic identities within Western countries and the effects of mass immigration in particular areas, but also looking at the current structures of corporate capital and its concentration into global networks of control. It means recognising capital’s role in homogenising culture’s across the board, making everyone “American” in their appreciation for melting pots of diversity and the lack of recognised national and sub-national distinctions. As Debord notes, the choice between assimilation and multicultural recognition is a nonsense as it never questions what one is assimilating toward. A mass overture of cultural white noise produced on demand through centralised production networks where any concept of control or choice are irrelevant. The definitions of sovereignty and nationality are thus mixed in with the platitudes of modern capital, limiting the extent of exit from this system by virtue of its cultural control. When Americanism is continually defined by products and fast food, one can see there is no such thing as an identity divorced from this commercialism in any kind of American nationalism. However there is no real escape from this system, from the organisation that Spengler described. Capital as flows and systems will not disappear because we attempt to primitivise ourselves. Instead working with and through these systems, creating more moveable definitions of identity, is the best way of creating collective institutions/organisations that reflect one’s identity and motivations. As Debord wrote in relation to French culture, “People will live on the surface of the Earth, and even here, when France has disappeared. The ethnic mix that will dominate is unforeseeable, as are their cultures, their very languages. One can affirm that the central and profoundly qualitative question will be this: will these future peoples dominate, through an emancipated practice, the current technique, which is globally that of the simulacrum and dispossession? Or, on the contrary, will they be dominated by it in a manner that is even more hierarchical and pro-slavery than today? One must envision the worst and fight for the best. France is assuredly regrettable. But regrets are vain”.
This then means forms of meaning-making that define themselves as against the current set of systemic structures. As capital destabilises and fragments into flows of data, knowledge and skills that become de-institutionalised, developing degrees of autonomy from human control which mean they exist in their own ethers, with their own languages and their own forms of technological development, we must look to identity construction built through similarly fragmented and bricoler structures. It means “removing all artificial associations, foremost the government that rules over you”, renouncing overt national identities that have long ago been routes for commercial activity within oligopolies. It further means rejecting the overt ideals of modernity in their construction of centralised apparatuses, state centralisation through bourgeois ideology, the veneration of republican ideals over traditional understandings and reactive polities, and contract theory that suggested everything from contractual obligations to property systems were the sole preserve of the state. It also means rejecting parallel systems of mass from the perspectives of racialism or nationalism, pan-Europeanism and the nonsense of multiculturalism in favour of parochial vestiges of governance and local/regional power that represent decentralisation and the ability to both react against and radically construct new identitarian structures. It also means rejecting the general concept of whiteness as a marker for organic identity construction, instead looking to pluralistic concepts with overlapping variables rather than a totalising narrative. Destabilisation does not favour gargantuan mass.
In this sense it is the construction of a politics of cunning, where ““accelerating the process” – or retarding the process – cannot be carried out from the vantage point of the State, because the State has been wholly subsumed by the process itself. This does not mean, however, that the political has been completely hollowed out. As long as the friend/enemy distinction and the management of activities surrounding it persists, the political hangs on – but from the U/ACC perspective, as well as the perspective taken by D&G as outlined above, these activities can only be contextualized and carried out from their irreversibly subordinated position. Deeper into the throes of the process – the deepening of world capitalist integration – and political activity becomes a question of how to relate to this process”. Ethno-cultural identity and organisation are striations in a world of autonomous processes and techonomic variables. They will never dominate or imperially coalesce, but nor will they be simply crushed except as a result of the failure of those within their respective ethnic enclaves to maintain their traditions and progenation. In Debord’s analogy, France is simply a dead element for any position of cultural protection. States are no longer, and nor have they truly been, the containers of homogeneous culture, and nor will they suddenly start becoming such things simply because we hope. There is a certain irony in Gordian’s position here, as he proposes parallel deep state structures for the organisation and preservation of Anglo and European identities, yet ignores the extreme failures the deep state has wrought upon itself. Through its involvement with the 2016 presidential election, it has helped bring about its own tribalistic stratification as the increasing dissatisfaction with central governmental institutions becomes more and more potent in daily American life. The halfway house between central authority and national dissolution he presents is problematic as a revised conservative position that attempts to stand still within modernity while everything rushes by.
Yet the scleroticism of modernity presents nothing but a quagmire of massification and the desire to stand still. It is conservatism in its most rank stupidity, assuming the modern world is something we would wish to conserve. It is the desire to add praxis to a world (universally understood in common), rather than create the pathways for multiple praxes informed by multiple inputs and outputs. It is egalitarian, humanistic and naive, throwing shade over left and right. Thus when looking at the crises of politics, economics and social breakdown, both spectrums talk about a return. Corbyn likes the 70s, May the 50s. Trump respects a vision of America rooted in the communities of the golden age, while the Democrats wanted time to stand still after 2015. All are part of this sclerotic conservatism, that assumes turning back is even possible let alone desirable. This vision should be smashed wholesale. There is no room for such nonsense, whether it be the vagaries of populism or its cousin social liberalism. Both talk of static, of the neverending perfection that awaited us back then. They talk of a codified, integrated international society, whether that be linked by nationalism or by liberalism. Either way, they are both corpses kept alive by minoritarian beliefs and individuals who cling to something that never existed. Some call them useful idiots for the system of modernity but that would be assuming they are useful. If there is to be a politics of the tribe, all fighting for a multi-scalar world of varying politics and economics that are shaped in the decentralist framework of exodus and re-engineering, then these conservatives (of all stripes) are the enemy within political (re)imaginations.
The creation of meaning-making and the development of solid ethno-cultural identities is likely to occur through bricoler structures which are fluid and able to change at a moments notice, evading the power of the Cathedral by sticking to the peripheries and being meta-systemic in their foundation, refusing to tie any eternalist identity to one particular organism or nation. It will come through a radical-reaction dialectic of different tendencies and ideological combinations colliding together into various governmental forms, akin to Proudhon’s sociology of revolution that recognises both the need of becoming and the desire to become.
Despite Gordian’s Plinth depicting itself as a deep state parallel, its really something similar to the bricoler systems I’m theoretically describing, being deconstructable and decentralised as it varies its power and influence across multiple organisations and groups, existing on the edge of mainstream institutions. As an historical example, many of the institutions and governmental forms present in feudal Europe had similar levels of decentralised tendencies that allowed for separate ethnic and cultural groups to develop kin selection and various channels of communication between themselves, whether through military and civic duties, petty wars, shared religiosity or trading relations. As Raico noted “After the fall of Rome, no universal empire was able to arise on the Continent. This was of the greatest significance. Drawing on Montesquieu’s dictum, Jean Baechler points out that ‘every political power tends to reduce everything that is external to it, and powerful objective obstacles are needed to prevent it from succeeding’ (Baechler 1975, 79). In Europe, the ‘objective obstacles’ were provided first of all by the competing political authorities” with “power was dispersed among estates, orders, chartered towns, religious communities, corps, universities, etc., each with its own guaranteed liberties”. However, such an argument does tend to ignore the power of imperial conquest, the development of primitive accumulation and the significant centralisation of states (English Civil War, French Revolution, Italian unification, the enclosure movement, etc.) which eliminated these jurisdictional varieties and traditional forms of law and politics. The reality is that both historical pictures present a much more interesting genealogy of European socio-economic power and relations. Without the centralisation of the state, and the development of unitary legal understandings and mass societies (which limited ground-up legal challenge and allowed for the destruction of church governance and the commons), a multiplicitous, multi-scalar form of European governance could have developed, with duties and contracts moving through multiple polities, markets representing a full gamut of subjective values, and economies of scale developing from the local level upwards, placing government in traditionalist understandings of law that represent cultural and economic variety. Linking this into a radical-reaction dialectic, decentralised polities allow both for technological developments and market formations of the economy alongside traditional value structures that can place these technologies and economies into a wider social system of multivarious value structures (based around metaphysical moral systems), thus capturing their value outside pure exchange and into political systems of cunning that work in and around these values. This then suggests a varied set of Dasein, one that combines nature, history and state in differential forms and that isn’t defined by any single unit.
Of course there is no chance of returning to some idyllic feudal past. Rather, a networked society of identity construction that is tribalistic in nature, in effect a networked tribalism that rejects the petty vagaries of universalism in favour of particularism that is both geographic and beyond spatiality, producing decentralised nations of leaders and Dasein with their own conceptions of alter-modernity, producing a multitude of socio-political realities and regulation. It is neither the nation or the state in the classical sense, but an advanced neo-medievalism of overlapping juries and tribes. In the current world, the internet presents itself as one such structure for identity construction amongst the de-containerisation of nation-states, where the social relations of technology can coalesce around an organic understanding of one’s place in the world, borne of national and communitarian circumstances that can have geographic and non-geographic facets. As Carlsbad notes, the effects of platform leadership and network effects on social media allow for platforms that layer hierarchies with shared racial/ethnic understandings. Thus technology takes an overtly political turn, as something integrable to communities as sites of socio-political action. In a system of multiple Dasein, technology becomes something related to the communities and leaders’ conceptions of rootedness and systematisation.
The world of the last man surrounds us, dying in its acceptance of a sclerotic modernity that is decaying and destabilising, becoming tribalistic and split amongst different, as yet undefined units. The Faustian dream of mass is thus an appendage of the wider political environment that may or may not be doomed to fail. Judging by the modern affects of liberalism and bastard children of the enlightenment, it seems its on course for failure. For all the talk of material progress, the spiritual/ideological vacuum will always need to be filled by something, in this case a growing set of particularisms and tribal enmities. In the techonomic landscape, the smooth surface of increasing variegation, we may well see a politics of cunning develop as Berger describes. One is thing is for sure, as Carlo describes there is no turning back. But this does not mean an eternal rise to self-deification, but rather the nihilistic recognition of man as amongst a set of destinies and systems beyond one’s control. Faustian dreams turn to nightmares and new pathways and positions as the things built by man, war machines and industrial technology amongst them, move beyond control and into the realm of surface-based collective recognition. However this doesn’t mean there shouldn’t be a search for greatness that allows for transcendence and the search for new destinies, it simply means that this search occurs within a surface of constant spatio-temporal flux with death as an eventual inevitability.
In developing a will to power, it must be recognised that life is “an assemblage of forces” producing organs that are to be interpreted and used. It is an organic process of ordering, involving resistance, reconstruction and reordering, thus de-quantifying power and qualifying along different subjectivities that aren’t pastiche parts of the prevailing ideological superstructure. The fundamentals are a fragmented, esoteric world. This presents new potentialities, as a fragmentary world seems to be the best means toward one where centralisation is delineated and eventually eliminated, moving power beyond the scope of simplistic structures that aim at ever higher accumulation of the flows of knowledge and capital. Fragmentary doesn’t mean a basic form of atomisation, along the lines of vulgar individualism where everyone is an internal hermit beholden to their own cathedral. It is instead a world of esotericism, of a range of particularisms and scales that dis-quantify flows and allow for the full machinations of genealogical pathways. It means ignoring the essence of some worldly truth that proclaims a universalistic parody, akin to forms of Protestant and modern Christian theology, or to the tenets of egalitarian humanism. It is the expansion of knowledge in all its forms, increasing its full heterogeneity. It is the integration of collectives along the lines of political production, where communities and polities self-organise into their own systems of order. Thus it is the production of esotericisms of an unknowable kind, from the castle and the altar to the market and the production process. It is the fundamental rejection of universality in all its guises, aiming instead a world fragmented and plated, overlapping and delineating along different circuits and scales.
Ethno-cultural identity is something that could and should be nurtured by these fragmented and decentralised sets of traditions. Any focus on white identity should be ignored as a fruitless aim that simply remakes the Marxian story, that of trying to capture the heights of culture that currently exist. These heights should not be conserved, for they are bastardised forms of the modernity that traditionalists and reactionaries should reject outright. Decentralisation is inherently against the mass society that destroys heterogeneity and the jurisdictional variability that defined many areas of Europe for centuries. It allows for mutualist understandings of governance in wider corporative structures of elites and lower orders, limiting the centralising effect of mass society in favour of the parochial and multi-scaled. A politics of divorce, moving one foot out of the system into the self-creative processes of another, indefinable system of meaning-making and society.
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 2006, P. xxii
 Martin Heidegger; Nature, State and History; 2015, P.19
 Oswald Spengler, Man and Technics, 2001, P.47-49
 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: Volume Two, 1928, 113
 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: Volume Two, 1928, 114
 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: Volume Two, 1928, 115
 Ed West, The Diversity Illusion, 2013, P.93
 Ed West, The Diversity Illusion, 2013, P.99
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 2017, P.365